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Abstract
I provide a new way to model bounded rationality and show the existence of recur-
sive equilibria with bounded rational agents. The existence proof applies to dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents and
incomplete markets. In this type of models, recursive methods are widely used to com-
pute equilibria, yet recursive equilibria do not exist generically with rational agents.
I change the rational expectation assumption and model bounded rationality as fol-
lows. Different from a rational agent, a bounded rational agent does not know the true
Markov transition of the state space of the economy. In order to make decisions, the
bounded rational agent would try to compute a stationary distribution of the state
space using a numerical method and then use the Markov transition associated with
it to maximize utility. For a certain distribution of the current period, given other
agents’ strategies, the agent would get its next-period transition: the distribution of
the state space in the next period that results from the competitive equilibrium in the
next period. However, if a distribution stays “closer” to its next-period transition than
the minimum error the numerical method can observe, the agent would consider it as
computational stationary. In equilibrium, each agent maximizes utility with a compu-
tational stationary distribution and markets clear. I use the Kantorovich-Rubinshtein
norm to characterize the distance between distributions of the state space. With this
set up, usual convergence criteria used in the literature can be incorporated and thus
many computed equilibria in the literature using recursive methods can be categorized
as bounded rational recursive equilibria in the sense of this paper.
Keywords : Recursive equilibrium; bounded rationality; heterogeneous agents; incomplete
markets.
*The author thank Felix Kubler for helpful discussions and comments.
1. Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents
and incomplete financial markets are extensively studied in the literature of economics and
finance. In this paper, I focus on recursive equilibria (or stationary Markov equilibria in
the terminology of stochastic games) of these models. Recursive equilibria are characterized
by a pair of functions (characteristic functions): a transition function mapping this period’s
“state” into probability distributions over next period’s state, and a “policy function” map-
ping the current state into current prices and choices. The state space is set to be the current
exogenous shock and the beginning-of-period distribution of assets across individuals. This
way of restricting the state space is often considered “minimal” or “natural” and widely used
in the literature for both philosophical and practical reasons as follows. The philosophical
reasons are the same as Maskin and Tirole’s (2001) reasons to consider Markov perfect equi-
libria (MPE). That is, the “natural” state space recursive equilibria “prescribe the simplest
form of behavior that is consistent with rationality”1, it “captures the notion that ‘bygones
are bygones’ ”, and it “embodies the principle that ‘minor causes should have minor effects’
”. On the practical side, recursive methods can be used to approximate stationary Markov
equilibria numerically. Heaton and Lucas (1996), Krusell and Smith (1998), and Kubler
and Schmedders (2003) are early examples of papers that approximate stationary Markov
equilibria in models with infinitely lived, heterogeneous agents.
Despite the importance of the recursive equilibria described above, there are cases when
recursive equilibrium does not exist for models with infinitely lived agents and incomplete
financial markets under standard assumptions. This problem was first illustrated by Hellwig
(1983) and since then has been demonstrated in different contexts. Kubler and Schmedders
(2002) give an example showing the nonexistence of stationary Markov equilibria in models
with incomplete asset markets and infinitely lived agents. Santos (2002) provides examples
of nonexistence for economies with externalities. Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) present
such examples for overlapping generations (OLG) models. Brumm et al. (2017) further
provide one simple example demonstrating the possibility of nonexistence.
The nonexistence problem has been explained (dealt with) in the literature from different
angles. Hellwig (1983) ascribed the reason of nonexistence to the “the simultaneous determi-
nation of prices for different periods”. He stated that “The concept of a rational expectations
equilibrium involves the simultaneous determination of prices for different periods. This si-
1In this case consistent with bounded rationality (which is specified later), since equilibria with rational
expectation assumption fail to exist generically.
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multaneity conflicts with the sequential nature of the temporary equilibrium process, so that
rational expectations equilibria can only be implemented if the auctioneer in each period is
informed of past expectations and uses them to select his temporary equilibria.”
Duffie et al. (1994) showed existence of competitive equilibria for general Markovian
exchange economies with a different state space. The authors also proved that the equi-
librium process is a stationary Markov process. However, we follow the well established
terminology in dynamic games and do not refer to these equilibria as stationary Markov
equilibria, because the state space also contains consumption choices and prices from the
previous period.
Citanna and Siconolfi (2010 and 2012) provide sufficient conditions for the generic ex-
istence of stationary Markov equilibria in OLG models. However, their arguments cannot
be extended to models with infinitely lived agents or to models with occasionally binding
constraints on agents choices, and for their argument to work in their OLG framework they
need to assume a very large number of heterogeneous agents within each generation.
Brumm et al. (2017) provide existence for stochastic economies with stochastic produc-
tions by assuming that there are two atomless shocks that are stochastically independent
(conditional on a possible third shock that can be arbitrary). This construction is provided
first by Dugan (2012), who proved the existence of Markov Perfect Equilibrium in noisy
stochastic games.
The literature showing the existence of recursive equilibria usually take the way of spec-
ifying the model set up such that although the agents do not make decisions recursively,
the optimal strategies take a recursive form in equilibrium. I differ from the literature by
reexamining the rational expectation assumption. Looking back at why we are interested
in recursive equilibria in the first place, rational expectation assumption is actually incon-
sistent with the reasons: Philosophically, a rational agent would not put any restrictions on
the form of the strategy and would consider the entire history to maximize utility; practi-
cally, the rational agent does not need an efficient algorithm to compute the equilibria or to
approximate equilibria since she knows the analytical solution to the maximization problem.
Simply put, when considering large complex economic systems, it is unrealistic to solve or
compute rational expectation strategies. So it is natural and necessary to consider bounded
rational behavior with recursive strategy that results in recursive equilibria.
Since the notion of bounded rationality had been brought up by Herbert A. Simon, it
has been modeled in varies ways. To cater to the current problem and to keep the set of
assumptions as weak as possible, my way of modeling bounded rationality can be simply
summarized as: The bounded rational agent would use numerical method to compute (ap-
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proximate) a “computational stationary equilibrium” instead of knowing the exact stationary
equilibrium (if it exists). To explain more specifically, the agent tries to find a computational
stationary distribution of the state space of the economy in the following way. For a certain
distribution of the current period, given other agents’ strategies, the agent would get its
next-period transition: the distribution of the state space in the next period that results
from the competitive equilibrium in the current period. Then if a distribution stays “closer”
to its next-period transition than the minimum error the numerical method can distinguish,
the agent would consider it as computational stationary. In equilibrium, each agent max-
imizes utility with a computational stationary distribution and markets clear. With this
set up, usual convergence criteria used in the literature can be incorporated and thus many
computed equilibria in the literature using recursive methods can be categorized as bounded
rational recursive equilibria in the sense of this paper. Potentially, this paper can provide a
foundation for computational recursive equilibria in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model set up.
Section 3 defines the bounded rational recursive equilibrium. Section 4 proves existence of
bounded rational equilibrium. Section 5 concludes the paper. Detailed proofs can be found
in the appendix.
2. The Economic Model
In this section we describe the model set up. The markets structure is adapted from the
Lucas (1978) asset pricing model. With this framework, we specify how a bounded rational
agent maximizes utility given a computed distribution of the state space of the economy and
an information set.
2.1. The Physical Economy
Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ N0. The exogenous shocks denoted by z realize from
a Euclidean space Z, and follow a first-order Markov process with transition probability
P(· | z) defined on the Borel σ-algebra Z on Z, P : Z × Z → [0, 1]. Let (zt)∞t=0, or in short
(zt), denote the stochastic process and let (Ft) denote its natural filtration. A history of
shocks up to some date t is denoted by zt = (z0, z1, ..., zt).
There are H types of agents, h ∈ H = {1, ..., H}. There is one perishable commodity
and J Lucas trees, j ∈ J = {1, ..., J}, denote the prices normalized to a simplex by p =
(pc, pJ) ∈ ∆J . The Lucas trees are long-lived assets in unit net supply that pay exogenous
positive dividends in terms of a single consumption good d : Z → RJ+. The agent h’s
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endowment is denoted by eh :∈ Z→ R+. The dividends and endowments are time-invariant
and measurable functions of the current shock. The agent h’s consumption for period t
is xh,t ∈ Xh; her holding of financial assets αh,t ∈ Ξh. The budget set is denoted as
Γh : Z × Ξh × ∆J ⇒ Xh × Ξh. The consumption vector of the economy is x ∈ X, the
asset holdings vector is α ∈ Ξ. X,Ξ are Euclidean spaces. There is no short selling on
trees, and we restrict the asset holdings vector with financial markets clearing conditions,
Ξ = (∆H−1)J .
Denote the minimal state space as S = Z × Ξ and associated Borel algebra as S. Also,
we specify an augmented state space that contains the exogenous shock, the beginning-of-
period asset holdings, the end-of-period asset holdings, and the prices similar as Duffie et al.
(1994). Denote the augmented state space as S˜ = Z × (Ξ × Ξ ×∆J) and associated Borel
algebra as S˜.
The characteristic transition of the economy is
F : S→ P(Ξ×∆J)
In the sense of Aliprantis and Border (2006) Chapter 19.2, we denote the associated transition
operator as F, the adjoint operator F′, and the kernel kF .
Then the Markov transition of the augmented state space F˜ : S˜ → P(S˜) generated by
F,P is defined as follows, for any s˜0 = [z0, (α−0 , α0, p0)] and letting µ = F˜ (s0), we have:
(i) the marginal on Z denoted as µZ = P(· | z0), and the marginal on Ξ− denoted as
µΞ− = δα0 almost surely;
(ii) for any z′0 ∈ supp(P(· | z0)), the conditional probability µ(· | (z′0, α0)) = F (z′0, α0).
Similarly, we denote the associated transition operator as F˜, the adjoint operator F˜′, and
the kernel kF˜ .
2.2. Utility Maximization of Agents
Given the economy described above, the agent h believe that the economy is in stationary
equilibrium and the stationary distribution is µh ∈ P(S˜). Then she would maximize utility
with an information set Ih ∈ Ih, where Ih is a finite dimensional Euclidean space. We first
specify the structure of the information set, and then introduce the utility maximization
problem.
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2.2.1. Information structure
The information set of agent Ih ∈ Ih consists of two parts, the price p ∈ ∆J and the
gathered information of asset holdings of other agents fhI : Ξ−h ×Ξ−h → Ih,α .
Assumption 2.1. 1. Ih,α is compact and convex for all h ∈ H;
2. fhI is continuous for all h ∈ H.
This set up is general and can incorporate many forms of information structures used in
the literature. We specify three special cases that satisfy Assumption 2.1 to illustrate this.
Special Case 1. fhI (α
−
−h, α−h) is a subset of (α
−
−h, α−h) for all h ∈ H. The agents would
have partial information of asset holdings of the economy. This setting is the same as the
“sparse max” agents used by Gabaix (2012), when agents do not put any weight on the
omitted information.
Special Case 2. fhI (α
−
−h, α−h) is the first several moments of α
−
−h. The agents would use
the match of moments to describe the distribution of asset holdings among agents. This set-
ting is the same as the bounded rational agents used by Krusell and Smith (1998). Although
Krusell and Smith (1998) assumed a continuum of agents in the model, the computation
part had to use a large number of agents.
Special Case 3. fhI (α
−
−h, α−h) = (α
−
−h, α−h) for all h ∈ H. The agents would have full
information of asset holdings of the economy. This setting also shows that Assumption 2.1
is harmless in the sense that it incorporate the full information setting. It will be shown
that with this special case, many computed equilibira with recursive method in the literature
with rational expectation assumption are in fact bounded rational recursive equilibria as I
will describe in the next section. One example is the computed equilibira by Kubler and
Schmedders (2003).
2.2.2. Utility function given an equilibrium distribution
Given probability space (S˜, S˜, µh), each agent h choose an arbitrary random variable
Th : S˜ → S˜, and denote the regular conditional probability measure of µh on A associated
with Th as µh(· | A). Denote the marginal of µh(· | A) on b as µh,b(· | A). Then the
prediction of the distribution of the next period’s information set Qh[I ′h | (z′, Ih)] can be
written as follows:
Qh[I ′h | (z′, Ih)] =
∫
α∈Ξ
µI [I
′
h | (α, z′)]µα[dα | Ih]
With P and Qh, we get the overall predicted transition probability as
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Rh[(z′, I ′h) | (z, Ih)] = Qh[I ′h | (z′, Ih)]P(z′ | z)
Easy to check that Rh[(z′, I ′h) | (z, Ih)] is a transition probability. Define µth, t ≥ 0 in the
same way as in 8.2 of Stokey (1989):
µth(A1 × ...× At | (z0, Ih,0))
=
∫
A1
· · ·
∫
At−1
∫
At
R(d(zt, Ih,t) | (zt−1, Ih,t−1))R(d(zt−1, Ih,t−1) | (d(zt−2, Ih,t−2))
· · · R(d(z1, Ih,1) | (z0, Ih,0)), where A1, ..., At ⊂ Z× Ih.
With the single period utility function uh : Z ×Xh → R, each agent maximizes a time-
separable expected utility function. For a given sequence (xh,t(zt, Ih,t), αh,t(zt, Ih,t))
∞
t=0,
Eµh [
∞∑
t=0
δtuh(zt, xh,t(zt, Ih,t))]
=uh(z0, xh,0(Ih,0)) +
∞∑
t=1
∫
(z,Ih)t
δtu(zt, xh,t(zt, Ih,t))µ
t(d(z, Ih)
t | (z0, Ih,0))
Each agent maximize the total utility subject to the budget constraint.
Uµhh (z0, α
−
h,0, Ih,0) = maxxh,t,αh,t
Eµh [
∞∑
t=0
δtuh(zt, xh,t(zt, Ih,t))]
(xh,t(zt, Ih,t), αh,t(zt, Ih,t)) ∈ Γ(zt, α−h,t, pt)
To compare this utility to rational expectation utility, consider the special case 3 men-
tioned above, where the agents have full information about asset holdings in the economy.
If the computed distribution µh is the “ture” stationary equilibrium (if it exists), then the
utility function coincides with rational expectation utility. In later sections, I will provide a
µh that is “close to be stationary” with an arbitrarily small error term.
2.3. Assumptions
To ensure the existence, a few further assumptions are needed.
Assumption 2.2. Z is compact and convex. For all z ∈ Z, P(· | z) is absolutely continuous
with respect to Lebesgue measure with density p(· | z).
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Assumption 2.3. 1. eh, d are bounded measurable functions. Further, there are e, e¯, d¯ ∈
R++ such that for all z, h, j
eh(z) ≥ e,
∑
h∈H
eh(z) ≤ e¯, 0 < dj(z) < d¯.
2. The agents’ discount factor satisfies δ ∈ (0, 1).
3. The utility functions uh : Z × X → R are measurable in z, continuous, strictly
increasing and concave in x.
The two assumptions above are standard in the literature, and we relaxed the assumption
that the utility functions are differentiable. Another assumption is needed to keep the
consumption and asset holding choices bounded is stated as follows.
Assumption 2.4. The agent cannot consume more than the aggregate amount of the com-
modity and cannot hold more than one unit of any tree–that is, (xh, αh) ∈ B. Where
B := {(x, α) : 0 ≤ x ≤ e¯+ Jd¯; 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1,∀j ∈ J}.
This assumption is needed because the bounded rational agent perceives the future dif-
ferently from the true distribution. Combined with Assumption 2.3, the budget set is
Γ(z, α−h , pt) = {pc(xh + d(z)α−h − eh(z)) + pJ(α−h − αh) ≤ 0} ∩B.
3. Bounded Rational Recursive Equilibrium
With the model set up above, I go on to define the bounded rational recursive equilibrium
in this section. First, I introduce the concept of computational stationary measure. And
then I define a bounded rational competitive equilibrium given computed distribution. Last
I define the bounded rational recursive equilibrium.
3.1. Computational Stationary Measure
Consider a state space (A,A), where A is a compact convex subset of a finite dimen-
sional Euclidean space and A is the Borel algebra. Denote a Markov transition as a Borel
measurable function P : A→ P(A). Denote the associated Markov transition operator and
its adjoint operator as P and P′, and denote the associated Markov kernel in the sense of
Aliprantis and Border’s (2006) Definition 19.11 as kP : A×A → [0, 1].
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To characterize distance between measures, we equip the space P(A) with the following
Kantorovich-Rubinshtein norm:
|| µ ||0= sup{
∫
A
fdµ : f ∈ Lip1(A), || f ||∞≤ 1},
where
Lip1(A) := {f : S→ R, | f(x)− f(y) |≤| x− y |,∀x, y ∈ A}.
Denote the space of those test functions as L(A) = {f ∈ Lip1(A) :|| f ||∞≤ 1}. By theorem
8.3.2 of Billingsley(2013), the topology generated by || · ||0 coincides with the weak topology
on P(A).
The agent is associated with a parameter abitrary small  > 0. The agent’s rational-
ity is bounded in the sense that she would consider two measures “close” enough if the
Kantorovich-Rubinshtein distance is within . We call a measure -computational stationary
with respect to P if it is “close” enough to its transition under P .
Definition 1 (Computational stationary measure). Measure u is said to be -computational
stationary with respect to P if || u−P′u ||0≤ .
3.2. Definition of Recursive Equilibrium
3.2.1. µh-Competitive Equilibrium
Different from rational expectation models, the agents perceive the future differently. So
the maximization problems need to be restated for each time period. To put it more formally,
we define the bounded rational competitive equilibrium as follows:
a µh-competitive equilibrium given initial conditions z ∈ Z, α−h ∈ Ξ consists of prices and
choices,
(p, (xh, αh)h∈H)
such that markets clear and each agent h optimize utility with respect to µh–that is to say,
(A), (B), and (C) hold.
(A) Commodity market clearing:∑
h∈H
xh =
∑
h∈H
eh(z) +
∑
j∈J
dj(z).
(B) Financial markets clearing: ∑
h∈H
αh = 1.
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(C) Utility maximization:
(xh,t, αh,t)
∞
0 ∈ arg maxEµh [
∞∑
0
δsuh(zt, xh,t(zt, Ih,t))],
where the budget set is
Γ(zt, α
−
h,t, pt) = {pc,t(xh,t + d(zt)α−h,t − eh(zt)) + pJ,t(α−h,t − αh,t) ≤ 0} ∩B,
and
(xh, αh) = (xh,0, αh,0), Ih,0 = (p, f
I
h(α
−
−h, α−h)).
With strictly increasing utility functions, this equilibrium can be represented by ((αh)h∈H, p)
using the budget constraint.
3.2.2. Bounded Rational Recursive Equilibrium
A -bounded rational recursive equilibrium (F, (µh)h∈H) consists of a characteristic tran-
sition
F : S→ P(Ξ×∆J)
and computational invariant measures µh for all h ∈ H
|| µh − F˜′µh ||0≤ ,
such that for all initial conditions s0 ∈ S, ((αh)h∈H, p) is a µh-competitive equilibrium if
((αh)h∈H, p) ∈ suppF (s0).
Again, recall the special case 3, if  = 0, we will have a recursive equilibrium with rational
agents. However, a positive  is needed to construct a continuous value function in the later
proof.
4. Existence of Bounded Rational Recursive Equilib-
rium
4.1. Perceivable Model Constructed by Bounded Rational Agents
There are two parts in this section. In the first part, I show that for any characteristic
Markov transition, there exists a computational invariant distribution with a continuous
density function. In the second part, I define a characteristic perceivable model as a function
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that maps a Markov transition to a computational invariant continuous density function.
And further, I show existence of a continuous perceivable model: a continuous function that
maps a Markov transition with its weak topology to a continuous density function with the
sup norm.
4.1.1. Continuous Density Functions
Let (N(A), || · ||∞) be the subset of (Cb(A), || · ||∞) such that for any f ∈ N(A), we
have f ≥ 0, ∫
A
fdλ = 1 so that the elements are all density functions. Denote µf as the
measure with density function f . Then we define a computational invariant density function
for agent h as follows.
Definition 2 (computational invariant continuous density). A function f is said to be a
computational invariant continuous density function with respect to P if f ∈ N(A) and
|| µf −P′µf ||0≤ .
Theorem 4.1. For any  > 0, the set of computational invariant continuous density func-
tions Υ(, P ) is non-empty, convex, and closed.
4.1.2. Continuous Perceivable Model
Denote the space of λ-equivalent class of Markov kernels kP : A × A → [0, 1] as KA,
and eqquip it with the weak topology τ(λ) defined as in 2.2 of Ha¨usler, Erich, and Harald
Luschgy (2015):
Kα → K ⇔
∫
f ⊗ hdλ⊗Kα →
∫
f ⊗ hdλ⊗K
for every f ∈ L1 and h ∈ Cb.
Then by Theorem 2.7 of Ha¨usler, Erich, and Harald Luschgy (2015), we have KA with
τ(λ) is a non-empty, weakly compact and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space.
We call a function mapping KA into P(A) a perceivable model. The agent gets a computed
distribution given any Markov transition. Then we define a continuous perceivable model as
follows.
Definition 3 (continuous perceivable model). A continuous perceivable model is a function
M : KA → N(A) that is continuous with respect to the τ(λ) weak topology and the || · ||∞
uniform norm.
Theorem 4.2. For any  > 0, there exists a continuous perceivable model M such that for
all kp ∈ KA, || µM(kp) −P′µM(kp) ||0≤ .
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Corollary 1. For any  > 0, there exists a continuous perceivable model M with a positive
lower bound b > 0 such that for all kp ∈ KA, || µM(kp)−P′µM(kp) ||0≤ , and infkpM(kp) ≥ b.
Denote the set of all continuous perceivable models satisfying conditions in Corollary 1 as
M(A), and denote the space of continuous density functions bounded below by b as Nb(A).
4.2. Existence of u.h.c. Policy Functions
In this section, we provide sufficient conditions under which the following functional
equation is equivalent as the utility function,
V µhh (z, α
−
h , Ih) = maxαh,xh
uh(z, xh) + δ
∫
V µhh (z
′, αh, I ′h)Q(d(I ′h) | (z′, Ih))P(z′ | z)
With the budget set
αh, xh ∈ Γ(z, α−h , p)
And the corresponding policy correspondence attains the maximum utility level.
Assumption 4.1. Z,X,Ξ are compact and convex.
Assumption 4.2. Γh : Z×Ξh ×∆J ⇒ Xh ×Ξh is weakly measuable, non empty, compact
valued, and continuous in Ξh ×∆J for all h.
Assumption 4.3. uh : Z × X → R is a bounded Caratheodry function for all h, and is
strictly increasing, and concave in x .
Define a continuous pricing density function as follows, and denote the Banach space of
all those functions as (Q(Ih × (Z× Ih)), || · ||∞).
Definition 4 (continuous pricing density function). q : (Ih× (Z× Ih))→ R is a continuous
pricing density function if
1. q is jointly continuous in all arguments;
2. For all s ∈ (Z × Ih), q(· | s) is a continuous probability density function (that is∫
Ih
q(i | s)di = 1, q(· | s) ≥ 0).
Assumption 4.4. Qh is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure with density
function qµh. And qµh ∈ Q.
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Theorem 4.3. Under Assumption 4.1- 4.4, for all qµh ∈ Q, there exists a unique bounded
function V
qµh
h : Z × Ξh × Ih → R such that V
qµh
h (z, α
−
h , Ih) = U
µh
h (z, α
−
h , Ih) is jointly con-
tinuous in (α−h , Ih, qµh), strictly increasing, and concave in α
−
h , and is measurable in z. The
policy correspondence G
qµh
h (z, α
−
h , Ih) is u.h.c., and convex valued in (z, α
−
h , Ih). Furthermore,
G
qµh
h (z, α
−
h , Ih) is measurable in z and admits a measurable selector.
The proof has a similar structrue as Theorem 9.2 in Stokey(1989) and is given in detail
in the appendix.
4.3. The Main Theorem
Recall the compact set A. Let A = S˜ for Corollary 1 and denote the corresponding lower
bound as b′. Denote Nb′(S˜) as the space of continuous density functions bounded below by b
′.
Then we can find a continuous mapping from a continuous density function to a continuous
pricing density function.
Lemma 4.1. Under Assumption 2.2, for any f ∈ Nb′(S˜) with associated µf , qµf is contin-
uous in all its arguments and uniformly continuous in f .
With this Lemma and Theorem 4.3, we can provide existence of a bounded rational
competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 4.2. Under Assumption 2.1- 2.4, for any function fh ∈ Nb′(S˜) and initial condi-
tions zt ∈ Z, α−h,t ∈ Ξ, there exists a µfh-competitive equilibrium, where µfh is the measure
with density function fh.
Denote the space of λ-equivalent class of Markov kernels k : S×S → [0, 1] as K, and the
space of λ-equivalent class of Markov kernels k : S˜× S˜ → [0, 1] as KF˜ . Equip both of them
with the τ(λ) weak topology, and recall the definition of kF˜ , we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Under Assumption 2.2, kF˜ is continuous in kF under weak topologies.
Theorem 4.4. Under Assumption 2.1- 2.4, for arbitrarily small  > 0, -bounded rational
recursive equilibrium exists.
By Corollary 1, choose a continuous perceivable model Mh ∈ M(S˜) for each agent h.
Then by Lemma 4.3, kF˜ is continuous in kF . So we can find for each agent a continuous
mapping Nh : K→ Nb′(S˜), where K is equipped with τ(λ) and Nb′(S˜) with || · ||∞.
For any kF ∈ K, given s ∈ S˜, choose fh = Nh(kF ). Denote the set of µfh-competitive
equilibria as RF (s). Let R(kF ) be the set of (equivalence classes of) measurable selections
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of RF . For all Y ∈ R(kF ), we embed Y (S˜) into P(S˜) via Y (s) 7→ δY (s), and denote δY as
the transition kernel generated by the embedding. Since Y is measurable by definition, we
get δY ∈ K. Denote the set K′(kF ) := {δY : Y ∈ R(kF )}, and the closure of the convex
hull of K′(kF ) as c¯oK′(kF ). Clearly, c¯oK′(kF ) ⊂ K. We show in the appendix that the map
K → c¯oK′(kF ) has a fixed point and generate the bounded rational recursive equilibrium
from the fixed point.
5. Conclusion
I provide existence of the recursive equilibrium in a dynamic stochastic model with
bounded rational agents. This set up is realistic when the economy is large and complex,
which is a fact for a lot of markets. A large and complex economy would effect the agents
in two ways: first, each agent would rely on recursive methods to optimize utility; second,
each agent cannot solve for the stationary equilibrium analytically and has to approximate
a equilibrium distribution.
The entire part of constructing a continuous value function does not put extra assump-
tions on the model, but it provide one possible interpretation of what the rationality is
bounded by – that is, the agent’s choices are continuous in the information she observes.
This is consistent with the philosophical principles stated in Maskin and Tirole (2001). Also,
the continuous value function is analogous to the continuity assumption of the utility function
in the static exchange economy models.
Although relatively abstract, this model has the potential to explore dynamic economic
models further in two main ways. First, it may provide foundation for many algorithms
computing general equilibrium models. As we stated before, examples like the computational
part of Krusell and Smith (1998) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) can be incorporated
into my set up. Second, it may generate interesting economic processes from standard set
up. As we can see from the proof, although the equilibrium is recursive, the Markov process
of the whole economy may not be ergodic. This may provide a new angle to study business
cycles and financial crisis from a standard model set up.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Section 4.1
A.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Clearly, (N(A), || · ||∞) is a convex, Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space.
The very first task is to find a compact subset of N(A). Consider the space of Ho¨lder
continuous functions Cα(A), α ∈ (0, 1) with the norm
|| f ||α=|| f ||∞ + | f |α, where | f |α= sup
x6=y
| f(x)− f(y) |
| x− y |α .
Denote the subset of Cα(A) uniformly bounded in || · ||α by M as CαM(A), it is compact.
Further we have NM(A) := N(A) ∩CαM(A) is compact for any M ∈ (0,+∞).
For any Markov transition P with associated adjoint operator P′, define a correspondence
GM as:
GM(f) ⇒ {f ′ ∈ NM(A) :|| µf ′ −P′µf ||0≤ }, ∀f ∈ N(A).
To prove the theorem, it is equivalent to show that for a large enough M , there exists a
fixed point of GM . The proof is structured as follows.
First we show that for large enough M , GM is non-empty, compact, convex valued. Equip
P(A) with the weak* topology σ(P ,Cb). Since A is compact, this coincide with the vague
topology σ(P ,Cc). And let L∞(A,A, λ) be the space of essentially bounded measurable
(equivalent classes of) functions equipped with the weak* topology σ(L∞, L1). By Theorem
19.9(2) of Aliprantis and Border (2006), for all f ∈ N(A), P′µf ∈ P(A). The following
lemma provides a function fˆ ∈ NM(A) as an approximate density function for P′µf .
Lemma A.1. Given  > 0, there exists an N < +∞ such that ∀M ≥ N, f ∈ N(A), GM(f)
is non-empty valued.
Proof: Consider s ∈ A with the embedding δs ∈ P(A), it is easy to construct a sequence
of nascent delta function ηN(· | s) ∈ NN(A) such that limN→+∞ ηN(· | s) → δs in the sense
of vague topology (which coincides with the weak*-topology on A). As an example, consider
the following mollifier:
ηN(x | s) = Ndim(A)ϕ(Nx | s),
where
ϕ(x | s) =
e−1/(1−|x−s|
2)/Const if | x− s |< 1
0 if | x− s |≥ 1
.
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Given the norm || · ||0 generates weak*-topology, there exists N < +∞, such that
sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
ηN(u | s)fL(u)dλ(u)− fL(s) |≤ .
Then by the symmetry of set A, we can easily construct a set of functions ηˆs ∈ NN(A)
such that for all s ∈ A,
sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(u)ηˆs(u)dλ(u)− fL(s) |≤ .
This means we found approximate density functions for all δs, s ∈ A, namely all extreme
points in P(A). By theorem 15.10 of Aliprantis and Border (2006), P(A) ⊂ c¯oA. Take the
closure of convex hull of ηˆs accordingly. Since the convex hull of ηˆs is uniformly bounded by
N in the || · ||α, the limit points also lies in NN(A). Then we can find fˆ ∈ NN(A) for all
µ ∈ P(A) such that
sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)fˆ(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dµ(s) |≤ .
Combined with the fact that P′µf ∈ P(A), we have GM(f) is not empty. 
Lemma A.2. For any f ∈ N(A), GM(f) is convex and close valued.
Proof: For any f ′1, f
′
2 ∈ GM(f), consider the convex combination f ′ = βf ′1+(1−β)f ′2, β ∈
(0, 1),
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|| µf ′ −P′µf ||0
= sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s) |
= sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)[βf
′
1(s) + (1− β)f ′2(s)]dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s) |
= sup
fL∈L(A)
| β[
∫
A
fL(s)f
′
1(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s)]
+ (1− β)[f ′2(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s)] |
≤β sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′
1(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s) |
+ (1− β) sup
fL∈L(A)
| f ′2(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s) |
≤β+ (1− β) = .
So f ′ ∈ GM(f), it is convex. Next, consider f ′n unif.−−−→ f ′, f ′n ∈ GM(f). Notice first
f ′ ∈ N(A) under uniform convergence. Using prove by contradiction, assume that || µf ′ −
P′µf ||0= ′ > ,
|| µf ′ −P′µf ||0
= sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s) |
≤ sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)f
′
n(s)dλ(s) |
+ sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′
n(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s) |
≤
∫
A
| f ′(s)− f ′n(s) | dλ(s) + .
This means
∫
A
| f ′(s) − f ′n(s) | dλ(s) ≥ ′ −  > 0 for all n, which contradicts uniform
convergence of f ′n. So GM(·) is close valued. 
Now we have GM is non-empty, compact, convex valued. Then we show that it is also
u.h.c., and then the Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan theorem applies.
Lemma A.3. GM(·) is u.h.c..
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Proof: Now we characterize the integral with P.
∫
A
fL(s)dP
′µf (s) =
∫
A
(PfL)(s)dµf (s)
by the way P,P′ are defined. By Theorem 19.7(4) of Aliprantis and Border (2006), PfL ∈
Bb(A). It is also easy to check that for any fL ∈ L(A), PfL ∈ Bb(A) is bounded by 1. So
for all f ∈ N(A), f ′ ∈ NM(A),
|| µf ′ −P′µf ||0
= sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
(PfL)(s)dµf (s) |
= sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
(PfL)(s)f(s)dλ(s) | .
Now consider a sequence of functions fn
unif.−−−→ f , and let f ′n unif.−−−→ f ′ where f ′n ∈ GM(fn),
we go on to show that f ′ ∈ GM(f).
sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
(PfL)(s)f(s)dλ(s) |
≤ sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′
n(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
fL(s)f
′(s)dλ(s) |
+ sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′
n(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
(PfL)(s)fn(s)dλ(s) |
+ sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
(PfL)(s)fn(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
(PfL)(s)f(s)dλ(s) |
≤ sup
fL∈L(A)
|
∫
A
fL(s)f
′
n(s)dλ(s)−
∫
A
(PfL)(s)fn(s)dλ(s) |
+
∫
A
| fn − f | dλ+
∫
A
| f ′n − f ′ | dλ
≤+
∫
A
| fn − f | dλ+
∫
A
| f ′n − f ′ | dλ→ .
So we have f ′ ∈ GM(f). 
Now choose M > N as in Lemma A.1. By the Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan theorem, the
set of fixed points of GM : NM(A) ⇒ NM(A) is non-empty. So the set of computational
invariant density functions Υ(, P ) is non-empty. The final part of the proof is to show that
it is also convex and close valued. It is analogous to Lemma A.2 and concludes the proof of
the theorem.
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A.2. Proof of Theorem 4.2
To simplify notations, redefine Υ(, P ) in a slightly different way: Define a correspondence
H as:
H(kP ) ⇒ {f ∈ N(A) :|| µf −P′µf ||0≤ }, ∀kP ∈ KA.
Lemma A.4. H is l.h.c..
Proof: By definition, we need to show ∀kPm ⇀ kP ,∀f ∈ H(kP ), there exists a subse-
quence of kPmk such that ∃fk ∈ H(kPmk ), fk → f .
First, kPm ⇀ kP , for all fc ∈ Cb(A),∫
A
∫
A
fc(u)kPm(s, du)f(s)ds→
∫
A
∫
A
fc(u)kP (s, du)f(s)ds.
By the definitions of kP ,P
′, this is equivalent to∫
A
fc(u)dP
′
mµf (u)→
∫
A
fc(u)dP
′µf (u).
Then further we have,
|| µf −P′mµf ||0→|| µf −P′µf ||0 .
So if f ∈ H(kP ) and || µf − P′µf ||0< , there exists m1 such that for m ≥ m1,
|| µf −P′mµf ||0< . Choose mk = m1 + k and fk = f , we get fk ∈ H(kPmk ), fk
unif.−−−→ f .
Otherwise, if f ∈ H(kP ) and || µf − P′µf ||0= . By theorem 4.1, there is also f ′ ∈
H(kP ) such that || v3 − v3Π ||≤ /2 <  (By choosing /2 as the lower bound). By the
convexity of Υ(, P ), there exists a sequence fk
unif.−−−→ f such that || µfk − P′µfk ||0< .
So by similar argument as the first scenario, there exists m(k) such that for m ≥ m(k),
|| µfk − P′mµfk ||0< . Then let m1 = m(1) and mk = max{m(k),mk−1 + 1}, k ≥ 2. And we
have fk ∈ H(kPmk ), fk
unif.−−−→ f . 
Given in Theorem 4.1 that the correspondence is convex, close valued, by Michael selec-
tion theorem, there exists a continuous selection.
A.3. Proof of Corollary 1
The proof is analogous to Lemma A.3 and can be provided upon request.
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Appendix B. Proofs of Section 4.2 (Theorem 4.3)
First, we define an operator Mqµf that projects bounded, Caratheodry functions to
bounded, Caratheodry functions for all bounded, Caratheodry pricing density qµ ∈ Q. And
Mqµf is jointly continuous in ((αh, Ih), qµ) . Mqµf is defined by
(Mqµf)(z, αh, Ih) =
∫
z′∈Z
∫
I′h
f(z′, αh, I ′h)qµ(I
′
h | (z′, Ih))d(I ′h)p(z′ | z)dz
Given z′ ∈ Z and qµ is continuous with compact support. So qµ is bounded. Then by
Theorem 19.7 of Aliprantis and Border (2006), Mqµf is measurable in z. Now fix z and
consider a sequence {(αmh , Imh , qmµ )} converging to (αh, Ih, qµ). Then we have
|Mqmµ f(z, αmh , Imh )−Mqµf(z, αh, Ih) |
≤ |Mqmµ f(z, αmh , Imh )−Mqmµ f(z, αh, Ih) |
+ |Mqmµ f(z, αh, Ih)−Mqµf(z, αh, Ih) |
= |
∫ ∫
[f(z′, αmh , I
′
h)qµ(I
′
h | (z′, Imh ))− f(z′, αh, I ′h)qµ(I ′h | (z′, Ih))]d(I ′h)p(z′ | z)dz |
+ |
∫ ∫
[qmµ (I
′
h | (z′, Ih))− qµ(I ′h | (z′, Ih))]f(z′, αhI ′h)d(I ′h)p(z′ | z)dz |
→0
The first term converges to 0 because f and qµ are continuous in (αh, Ih); the second
term converges because of the uniform convergence of qmµ . Then we define another operator
Tqµf as
(Tqµf)(z, α
−
h , Ih)) = maxαh,xh
uh(z, xh) + δ(Mqµf)(z, αh, Ih)
αh, xh ∈ Γ(z, α−h , p)
For given (α−h , Ih, qµ), by Theorem 18.19 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), Tqµf is mea-
surable in z. Fix z and consider a sequence {(α−mh , Imh , qmµ )} converging to (α−h , Ih, qµ). Then
we have
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| Tqmµ f(z, α−mh , Imh )− Tqµf(z, α−h , Ih) |
≤ | Tqmµ f(z, α−mh , Imh )− Tqmµ f(z, α−h , Ih) |
+ | Tqmµ f(z, α−h , Ih)− Tqµf(z, α−h , Ih) |→ 0
The first term converges to 0 because Tqmµ f(z, ·) is continuous according to maximum
theorem. For the second term, since f is bounded, for a given z, uh(z, xh)+δ(Mqµf)(z, αh, Ih)
is uniformly continuous in qµ . So the maximum over the same compact budget set also
converges to 0.
Then by induction with the same argument as above, we have T nqµf is measurable in z
and jointly continuous in (α−h , Ih, qµ) for all n ∈ N++
Easy to check that Blackwell’s sufficient conditions are satisfied for Tqµ for all qµ ∈ Q.
Then take any Caratheodry function f0, and we have the value function V
qµ = T∞qµ f0.
Obviously, V qµ is measurable in z and jointly continuous in α−h , Ih, qµ.
More specifically, choose a Caratheodry function fˆ0 that is strictly increasing, and concave
in α−h . Analogously, we get V
qµ = T∞qµ fˆ0 is measurable in z and jointly continuous in α
−
h , Ih, qµ
and strictly increasing, and concave in α−h . The equivalence of the functional equation and
the utility function is directly implied. To describe the policy correspondence, notice
V qµ(z, α−h , Ih) = maxαh,xh
uh(z, xh) + δ
∫
z′∈Z
∫
I′h
V qµ(z′, αh, I ′h)qµ(I
′
h | (z′, Ih))d(I ′h)p(z′ | z)dz
αh, xh ∈ Γ(z, α−h , Ih).
Fix z, by maximum theorem, we haveG
qµh
h (z, α
−
h , Ih) is u.h.c., and convex valued in (α
−
h , Ih, qµh).
And fix (α−h , Ih, qµh), by Theorem 18.19 of Aliprantis and Border (2006), G
qµh
h (z, α
−
h , Ih) is
measurable in z and admits a measurable selector. 
Appendix C. Proofs in Section 4.3
C.1. Proof of Lemma 4.1
As described in Section 3, we can write qµf as follows, when f is a continuous density
function:
qµf (I
′
h | (z′, Ih)) =
∫
α
fI(I
′
h | (z′, α))fα(α | Ih)dλ(α), (1)
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fI and fα are defined as follows:
fα[α | Ih] =
∫
s∈Sα,Ih
f(s)ds∫
s∈SIh
f(s)ds
where Sα,Ih = {s : z(s) = z, Ih(s) = Ih, α(s) = α} and SIh = {s : z(s) = z, Ih(s) = Ih};
Similarly, we have
fI [I
′
h | (z′, α)] =
∫
s∈SI′
h
,(z′,α)
f(s)ds∫
s∈S(z′,α) f(s)ds
where SI′h,(z′,α) = {s : z(s) = z′, α−(s) = α, Ih(s) = I ′h} and S(z′,α) = {s : z(s) = z′, α−(s) =
α}.
Easy to check, the four integrals in the definitions of fI , fα are bounded linear transfor-
mations of f . Hence, they are all uniformly continuous in f . Further, if f ∈ NJb′(S), all
these four integrals are bounded away from 0. Then we have fI , fα are uniformly continuous
in f and hence fI ·fα is uniformly continuous in f . Next, notice the integration in (3) is also
a bounded linear operator. So we have qµf is uniformly continuous in f . And it is trivial to
check that qµf is jointly continuous in all its arguments. 
C.2. Proof of Lemma 4.3
To show that kF˜ is continuous in kF , consider a sequence kFn ⇀ kF in τ(λ), so we have
for all f ∈ L1(S), g ∈ Cb(Ξ×∆J),∫
S
∫
Ξ×∆J
f(s)g(a)dFn,s(a)dλ(s)→
∫
S
∫
Ξ×∆J
f(s)g(a)dFs(a)dλ(s). (2)
By Theorem 2.6 of Ha¨usler, Erich, and Harald Luschgy (2015), this is equivalent to for
all measurable, bounded function h : (S,Ξ×∆J)→ R such that h(s, ·) ∈ Cb,
∫
S
∫
Ξ×∆J
h(s, a)dFn,s(a)dλ(s)→
∫
S
∫
Ξ×∆J
h(s, a)dFs(a)dλ(s). (3)
We go on to show that for all f ′ ∈ L1(S˜), g′ ∈ Cb(S˜)
∫
S˜
∫
S˜
f ′(s)g′(a)dF˜n,s(a)dλ(s)→
∫
S˜
∫
S˜
f ′(s)g′(a)dF˜s(a)dλ(s)
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where∫
S˜
∫
S˜
f ′(s)g′(a)dF˜n,s(a)dλ(s) =
∫
S˜
∫
Z
∫
Ξ×∆J
f ′(s)g′(a)dP(z′ | z)dFn,(z′,α)(a)dλ(s).
First, for all z, α, letting h := p(z′ | z)g′(z′, α, α′, p′), from (2) we have
∫
Z
∫
Ξ×∆J
p(z′ | z)g′(z′, α, α′, p′)dFn,(z′,α)(α′, p′)dλ(z′)→∫
Z
∫
Ξ×∆J
p(z′ | z)g′(z′, α, α′, p′)dF(z′,α)(α′, p′)dλ(z′).
Since g′ ∈ Cb, g′ is bounded. Denote the bound as B, we have
∫
Z
∫
Ξ×∆J
p(z′ | z)g′(z′, α, α′, p′)dFn,(z′,α)(α′, p′)dλ(z′) ≤
∫
Z
p(z′ | z)Bdλ(z′) = B.
So by dominated convergence theorem, we have∫
S˜
∫
S˜
f ′(s)g′(a)dF˜n,s(a)dλ(s)→
∫
S˜
∫
S˜
f ′(s)g′(a)dF˜s(a)dλ(s).

C.3. Proof of Lemma 4.2
Given f ∈ Nb′(S˜), by Lemma 3.2, we have qµf ∈ Q. Combined with Assumptions 4.1-4.3,
all the assumptions in section 3 are satisfied. So the equilibrium conditions are equivalent
to the following conditions:
(A) Commodity market clearing:∑
h∈H
xh,t =
∑
h∈H
eh(zt) +
∑
j∈J
dj(zt)
(B) Financial market clearing: ∑
h∈H
αh,t = 1
(C’) Utility maximization:
xh,t, αh,t ∈ Gqµhh (zt, α−h,t, Ih,t)
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Define a price player’s best response ψ : X×Ξ⇒∆J by
ψ((xh,t, αh,t)h∈H) = arg max
p∈∆J
{pc,s
∑
h
(xh,s + d(zs)α
−
h,s − eh(zs)) + pJ,s(
∑
h
αh,s − 1)}
Then the standard existence proof of a static exchange economy applies. See, for example,
Lemma 3 of Brumm et al. (2017). 
C.4. Proof of Theorem 4.4
First, notice that s ⇒ RF (s) is measurable. This is shown in the proof of Lemma 4
of Brumm et al.(2017). Then by theorem 18.13 of Aliprantis and Border(2006), RF has a
measurable selector. So the map kF ⇒ R(kF ) is non-empty valued. Then in the same way as
the second part of the proof of Lemma 4 of Brumm et al.(2017), we can get kF ⇒ R(kF ) has
a closed graph. Then by the definition of K′ as a subset of K equipped with τ(λ), we have
kF ⇒ K′(kF ) has a closed graph. Then theorem 17.35(1) in Aliprantis and Border(2006)
implies that kF ⇒ c¯oK′(kF ) has a closed graph. Apply Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan theorem,
we have a fixed point k∗F ∈ c¯oK′(k∗F ).
If k∗F ∈ coK′(k∗F ), choose f ∗h = Nh(k∗F ). Then (F ∗, (µf∗h)h∈H) is a -bounded rational
equilibrium.
If k∗F /∈ coK′(k∗F ), we make use of the fact that  is arbitrarily small, and repeat the
procedure above for ′ = /2. And we find another fixed point k′F ∈ c¯oK′(k′F ). If k′F /∈
coK′(k′F ), then we can choose k
′′
F ∈ coK′(k′F ) within an arbitrary ε-neighbourhood of k′F ,
and f ′h = Nh(k
′
F ) such that (F
′′, (µf ′h)h∈H) is a -bounded rational equilibrium. 
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